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LANDSAT-7:

MANAGING THE TRANSITION
J. R. Hill , Geor9e Komar, Gregory Williams

ABSTRACT

The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, {Public Law
PL102-555) recognized the importance of continuous
collection and utilization of land remote sensing data from
space . The Department of Defense (DoDJ and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were responsible
as the Landsat Program Management. The program proceeded
with DoD developing the satellite and NASA developing the

ground system.

Each agency was for responsible its

respective technical and budget requirements.

In the fall of 1993 severe budget constraints, the loss of
Landsat-6 and DoD ' s desire to withdraw from the program
resulted in the reassessment of the Landsat Program by the
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) . The Land
Remote Sensing Strategy, Presidential Decision
Di rec ti ve (POD) /NSTC-3 , established the restructured program,
ensured data continuity and extended collection of the 20year Landsat data set . This strategy, signed in May 1994,
established new roles for NASA, the Department of
Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) , and the Department of the Interior/US Geological
Survey (USGS) .
A joint NASA/DoD transition plan established the timing of
the transfer of the development contract and associated
funding . The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
(PL103-211) established the funding transfer limit from DoD
to NASA, and required the NASA Administrator to certify the
fiscal aspects of the program to Congress . A revised
Landsat Management Plan established the NASA, NOAA, and USGS
roles, funding commitments and program requirements . The
NASA Administrator certified the plan to Congress on May 5 ,
1994, ensuring a launch as early as possible to minimize a
data · gap risk .
The program has stabilized with a launch commit date of
December 1998 which minimizes the risk o f a data gap and
ensures continuity of Landsat data into the next century .
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HISTORY :

IN THE BEGI NNING •••

The Landsat program, begun by NASA in 1969, has been in
continuous operation since the launch of Landsat 1
(originally Earth Resources Technology Satellite, ERTS-ll in
1972. Four more Landsats were developed and launched by
NASA (Landsat - 2 in 1975, Landsat-3 in 1978, Landsat-4 in
1982 and Landsat-5 in 1984).
NASA operated Landsat as
experimental system until 1979 when, pursuant to
Presidential Directive H54, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) assumed control over
operations . The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act
of 1984 (Public Law 98-365) mandated privatization of
Landsat.
In 1985, in response to the Congressional
mandate, NOAA contracted with EOSAT Corporation to provide
Landsat operations and marketing of the data. EOSAT,
through agreements established by the Department of Commerce
(DoC) also provides data from Landsats-4 and - 5 via direct
downlink to non-US ground stations . Landsat - 6, was procured
by NOAA through the EOSAT contract for launch in October
1993, but failed to achieve orbit.
LANDSAT-7 DEVELOPMENT : THE WAY WE WERE

Prices for Landsat data under the privatized arrangement,
resulted in overly restricted access by researchers to a
resource procured with public funds. Discontent with this
situation resulted in repeal of Public Law 98-365 and
replacement with Public Law 102-555 which returned
development, operations and data distribution functions of
the Landsat Program to the government. The new law
established the Landsat Program Management (LPM) comprised
of the DoD, responsible for the acquisition of the Landsat-7
satellite, and NASA, responsible for development of the
ground system. This Public Law also recognized the role of
the USGS in the Landsat Program as the agency responsible
for archiving and providing user access to all Landsat data.
The law requires establishing a data policy ensuring the
price of unenhanced Landsat data be commensurate with the
cost of fulfilling user re-quests.
D.evelopment of Landsat-7 proceeded as planned through the
first year. DoD through a competitive procurement initiated
a contract with General Electric (now Martin Marietta Astra
Space (MMAS)) in December, 1992, for development of the
space segment. The contract included the Enhanced Thematic
Mapper Plus (ETM+) subcontracted to Hughes Santa Barbara
Research Center (SBRC) as the "continuity" instrument and an
option for a second, high technology instrument, the High
Resolution Multispectral Stereo Imager (HRMSI). Landsat - 7
was scheduled for launch no later than 5 years after the

launch of Landsat- 6, as required by PL102-555. NASA
developed plans for a ground system, integrating the work as
much as possible with the ground system for the Earth
Observing System Data and Information System (EOSDIS) and
working closely with the USGS EROS Data Center (EDC) where
the Landsat data would be archived, processed and
distributed.
Events in the fall of 1993 caused a re-assessment of the
Landsat Program by the National Science and Technology
Council (NSTCJ. Landsat- 6, a cornerstone of the reasoning
behind the law was launched on October 5 , 1993 but did not
reach orbit . This loss presented a significant threat to
Landsat data continuity, and prompted a re-examination of
the capabilities of the remaining active systems (Landsats-4
and - 5) and the development of Landsat- 7.
The FY94 budget requests from DoD and NASA included funding
in excess of the program baseline for costs associated with
the development of HRMSI and the ground system capabilities
necessary to acquire and process the HRMSI data. DoD was
successful in obtaining funds to develop HRMSI, but the NASA
appropriation did not include a commensurate increase for
the ground system. Although DoD and NASA worked toward a
realignment of the program that would allow inclusion of
HRMSI within the total budget appropriated to the two
agencies for Landsat , a program acceptable to DoD and NASA
management could not be developed . Because of insufficient
funding to include bot h instruments , and the emerging
requirement within DoD for HRMSI-type data, DoD and NASA
agreed the program should be restructured. This intention
was communicated to the Administration in early December,
1993. At the direction of NSTC, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) initiated a review and
restructuring of the Landsat-7 Program.
DEVELOPING OPTIONS:

WHICH YELLOW BRICK ROAD?

The time frame available for developing options was
extremely constrained . All participants recognized the need
to reach a decision as soon as possible in order to maintain
the launch schedul e, to incorporate any decision in the FY95
budget, and to address DoD ' s intention to withdraw from the
program. As a result, NASA ' s ability to estimate the
attributes and potential consequences of each option was
limited, particularly in the area of cost and budget
projections .
A number of other uncertainties remained at the time of t h e
recommendation :

...

1. It was clear that the program could not be accommodated
solely within existing or planned NASA resources.
NASA
explored a number of options to resolve this situation
(including the transfer of funds from DoD and teaming with
NOAA) and eventually developed an executable program
concept.
2. NASA's options and recommendation relied on a number of
anticipated actions by the Congress, including possible
revision of the Public Law and transfer of funds from DoD to
NASA. NASA made every effort to seek informal assurances
from the necessary congressional staff that such changes
could be approved.
3. Though NOAA expressed significant interest in
participating in the revised program (through operation of
the existing ground system with modifications to support
data throughput requirements), at the time of the
recommendation, there was no funding commitment from NOAA
nor any formal indication of Doc support.
After extensive discussion with OSTP and comments from other
participants in the pro gram (NOAA, USGS, DoD), on February
7, 1994, NSTC recommended the option involving the
continuation of the current contract as the basis for
restructuring the program. Under this option, NASA would
continue the current Landsat-7 Program with at least the
ETM+ sensor and utilize, to the maximum extent practical,
existing Landsat contracts, hardware, software, and
facilities. NOAA would participate in the Landsat program
through provision of a ground system operations capability
that maximizes the utilization of existing resources.
DoD
would transfer its remaining FY94 funds for Landsat to NASA.
In addition, this option provided a pathway for the
inclusion of a high technology instrument in the 1998 time
frame (subject to the availability of technical/financial
resources) and it supported the inclusion of a high
technology successor instrument approach for the EOS AM-2
mission in 2004.
This option was the quickest path to maintaining continuity
with the earlier Landsat data and was less likely to meet
Congressional resistance.
It continued work already begun
on the instrument and spacecraft, and maintained the
earliest practical launch date. However, this option
required more funds in FY94 and FY95 than other options .

..

MAKING THE TRANSITION: TRANSPLANTING A NEW LIMB

Rescopinq the Content
Once the NSTC Deputies had made the recommendation to
continue with the current contract, NASA began working with
DoD to rescope the contract to reduce program costs. A
direct wide band (X-band) data link was adopted rather than
the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TORS) data link, thus
the TORS antenna could be deleted. A NASA in-house ground
system was integral to the restructured program. This
permitted deleting the Flight Operations Segment from the
development contract. The Global Positioning System (GPSJ
capability had been incorporated into the design based on
accuracy requirements of the HRMSI. The HRMSI, a part of
the DoD requirements was deleted and the GPS would no longer
be required. In each case rapid trade studies were
conducted to evaluate proposed deletions and modifications.
These trade studies gave sufficient confidence for NASA to
request OoD, who was still responsible for managing the
contract, to execute a partial termination associated with
these design attributes.
Transition Agreement
In parallel to the rescoping, NASA drafted and coordinated
with DoO a plan for transitioning the contract and
associated remaining OoD funding. Tasks for NASA and DoD
were outlined and a timeline developed. The plan indicated
transfer of the contract to NASA immediately following
approval of the plan by both agencies.
Congress in the mean time was developing a disaster relief
appropriation associated with the California earthquake and
Mississippi River flooding. The Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, (Public Law 103-211) passed on Feb 11,
1994, provided new and unexpected guidance to the Landsat
Program. This Public Law limited the funding transfer to
NASA to $90M, reducing the expected funding by $13M.
Additionally it required the NASA Administrator to certify
to the Congress the fiscal year and total program funding to
be within NASA's budget prior to the .transfer of the
program. This placed the resolution of funding issues in
the critical path of implementing a restructured Landsat-7
program. Transfer of the FY94 DoD Landsat funds was crucial
to maintaining a program schedule that supported data
continuity and continuing the MMAS contract after transfer
of contract authority from DoD to NASA.
Through March and April, NASA worked detailed program cost
estimates for the satellite and ground system. The program
cost estimates were based on the best estimates available,
but most were "top down" addressing program descopes and
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known areas of concerns. At this time NASA had not
conducted a detailed analysis of the spacecraft design and
the ground system was based on conceptual design estimates.
Additionally, design, management and process changes
resulting from the NASA Chief En gineer's Office review of
recent spacecraft failures had not been included in the
estimates. These factors added additional risk to the total
program costs. Program reserves were adjusted to partially
account for these risks as a final budget was determined.
Externally, discussions with NOAA resulted in a NOAA
proposal to joi n the LPM and contribute funding to NASA's
ground system development program. Agreement was reached
with NOAA on the funding level and timing, and the Doc
Secretary provided a letter to NASA committing support to
the program.
On May 5, 1994 the President signed PDD/NSTC-3 "Land Remote
Sensing Strategy" providing formal direction to all agencies
involved. This formalized the withdrawal of DoD from the
LPM and addition of NOAA and USGS. Concurrently, the NASA
Administrator transmitted a certified budget plan, including
the commitment letter from Doc, to the relevant
Congressional Committees. With the PDD signed and the
certified budget plan submitted, NASA requested the formal
transfer of the program (contract and funding) from DoD .
The contract transfer occurred in mid-May. The final
transfer of DoD Landsat funding to NASA occurred in midJuly.
TAKE THE BALL AND RUN

NASA received the contract and immediately implemented the
planned restructuring. The SBRC contract (ETM+ instrument)
was separated from the MMAS contract and placed under direct
NASA management reducing overhead costs and total program
costs. Since this occurred later than planned, the near term
program costs had increased.
A detailed review by NASA engineers of the spacecraft and
instrument subsystems was initiated. Detailed design issues
arose that were not known prior to budget certification.
Design alternatives were explored to evaluate technic al and
program risks. As this review continued leading to the
Preliminary Design Review additional program cost risks were
identified.
A new Landsat Program Management Plan was written
establishing the roles NASA, NOAA, and USGS. The Plan
established the program requirements and funding commitments
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to support the program. The plan, approved by all agencies
in August 1994, established the basis for the agencies'
budget submi ttals for FY96.
CONCLUSION: STABILIZED AND RECOVERING

The decision to proceed with the Landsat-7 Program was
recognition by NSTC of the critical national priority of the
program. The situation required a rapid and credible
response; long periods for study were not available.
Through exhaustive efforts by officials at GSFC and NASA
Headquarters in the limited time available, NASA developed
an option that met key requirements to preserve data
continuity, minimize risk of a data gap, fulf ill the data
policy goals of Public Law 102-555, and reduce t h e total
program cost. This formed the basis for the reconunendation
from NSTC and resulted in the Presidential Decision
Directive.
The program has stabilized with Congressional s upport
indicated by the FY95 Appropriation. The new Landsat
Program Management has been established as evid e n ced by the
Landsat Program Management Plan signed by the three partner
agencies defining their roles and funding conuni tments.
Needed design changes have been approved and the spacecraft
is proceeding into the detailed design phase. Th e program
has a launch conunit date of December 1998 which minimizes
risk of a data gap and ensures conti nued long term
continuity of Landsat data into the next century.
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